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The Russian intervention in Crimea is considered by many analysts as the most severe crisis
between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. The United States and EU but also all
the countries of the former Soviet Union, are particularly concerned by this crisis that could affect
them one way or the other. As a member of the West bloc and despite its recurrent attempts to
emerge as an autonomous actor on the international scene, Turkey is also concerned by the
Crimean crisis for at least two reasons: Tatars of Crimea are or a Turkic origin and as such their fate
draws interest in the whole Turkic world, and Turkey is an immediate neighbor to the conflict zone.
Should the conflict between Russia and the West over Crimea worsens, Turkey, as a NATO
member and controlling power over the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits, could be engulfed in this
new crisis. Ankara is facing a real dilemma. Indeed, the choice is going to be tough between
solidarity with Crimean Tatar brothers and Ukrainian territorial integrity, while pursuing continued
good relations with a much feared but economically powerful neighbor like Russia. As of today,
Turkey cannot afford to take a strong position.
Why and How Is Turkey Concerned and Affected by the Crimean Crisis?
The first reason why Turkey is so concerned is because Crimea is the home to a Turkic ethnic
population, the Tatars, with whom the Turks share common cultural, linguistic, religious and
historical background. From 1441 to 1783, Crimea was a powerful Khanate under Ottoman
protectorate. When it fell under Russian domination, local Muslim populations who were the
majority, left their homeland and took refuge in Ottoman provinces. Like other Muslim groups who
fled from the Russian invasion in the 19th century, like Circassians, Abkhaz and Muslim Georgians
among others, Crimean Tatars are more numerous in Turkey than in their homeland. Various
sources estimate there are currently at least 3 million of Tatars living in Turkey, although there are
only 300 000 of them left in Crimea for a mere 12 percent of the population. Massively deported to
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Central Asia in the early 1940s by Stalin for alleged collaboration with Nazi forces during the
Second World War, Crimean Tatars and their diaspora got organized and developed a strong sense
of the community survival, networking and mobilization. Their determination to return started even
before the end of the Soviet Union even though such initiatives had little chance to succeed. In
Turkey they are among the best organized minority groups with dozens of associations all across
the country, but they are particularly strong in Ankara and Eskisehir. Moreover, Tatars benefit from a
very positive image in Turkey. In fact Turkish nationalism thrived from the works of prestigious Tatar
thinkers, like Ismail Gasprinkski and Yusuf Akçura who are not only venerated by Turkish
nationalists but also by other nationalist groups in the Turkic world. Uzbek, Kazakh, Azeri and others
have shown a great respect and moral debt for Tatar intellectuals of the 19th century who played a
crucial role in the modernization of Muslim societies within the Russian empire. This modern
nationalistic philosophy aiming at empowering Russian Muslims, also called Jadidism, had among
its most influential members a lot of Tatar intellectuals. After the end of the Soviet Union, Crimea, as
part of independent Ukraine was granted a special autonomous status, and opened up to the world
outside. Turkey was among the first neighbors to show interest and develop cooperation. TIKA, the
Turkish official economic cooperation agency created in 1992 to support the development of ties
with the post-Soviet republics, is very active in Crimea. As far as religious cooperation is concerned,
the Diyanet, the official Turkish board for the management of Islam in Turkey, is very active too.
Crimean Tatars' prestige in Turkey and great capacity for mobilization make them an influential
minority, even in terms of electoral vote. Because of this, Tatars of Crimea in Turkey may have a
substantial influence on Turkish politics.
The second concern for Turkey is about security issues, as the crisis zone is very close to Turkey.
Should the situation escalate into a conflict and open confrontation between Russia and the West,
Turkey could be torn between its loyalty to its Western NATO partners, and its good and strong
economic relations with Russia. Strategically, Turkey has complete control over the Bosphorus and
Dardanelles straits between the Black Sea, the Marmara and the Mediterranean, as a result of the
1936 Montreux treaty. Allowing Western naval intervention through the straits to support
independent Ukraine against Russia would put Ankara in a very uncomfortable position. The
worsening of the situation will only show Turkish diplomacy’s incapacity to deal with its own
neighborhood. Back in 2008 when Russians invaded Georgia to support the separatist region of
Ossetia, Turkey was also very upset by its exposed failure to broker any fruitful negotiation to
resolve the conflict. In 2014, Turkey is in an even more striking dilemma and has even less leverage
to take action.
Ankara's Lack of Reaction
Since the crisis started Turkey’s minister of foreign affairs visited Ukraine and Crimea and the prime
minister spoke on the phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Both Ahmet Davutoglu and
Recep Tayyip Erdogan show rhetorical caution, calling both parties to dialogue and negotiation for a
pacific solution. Meanwhile Turkey has expressed it solidarity with the Crimean Tatars, and its
support for Ukrainian territorial integrity. Turkey can hardly afford anything more in the crisis than
cautiousness for peace and stability. Indeed for both internal and external reasons, Turkey is
constrained to remain a casual observer.
The domestic political situation in Turkey is such that the Turkish government won’t be able to take
concrete measures to help Tatar brothers in Crimea. Threatened by serious corruption scandals that
are more than mere allegations, the Turkish prime minister has other priorities. For sure, there is
risk that criticisms will strike another blow to the AKP (Justice and Development party) government.
Several political parties in Turkey, such as the nationalist Milli Hareket Partisi, the Party for a
Nationalist Movement, criticized AKP's indifference toward Tatars. However, it might be for the
better, as prime minister should concentrate on solving domestic issues, like the Kurdish issue or
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the institutional crisis.
Turkey's low profile over the Crimean crisis can also be explained by its traditional diplomacy and
regional implications. Turkey surely does not wish to confront Russia, which has always been
throughout history a towering rival and a fear-inspiring neighbor. Ottomans and Turks have always
feared Russian military assaults, as they watched the conquests over the Caucasus and Central
Asia and it is well known that these threats have grandly contributed to the rapprochement between
Turkey and the West. From 1853 to 1856, the Ottomans, French and British already waged a war
against Russia in Crimea. By the end of the Second World War, Soviet threats against Turkey,
relating to their use of the straits, and their territorial claims on Kars and Ardahan pushed Turkey to
join NATO. Continuously after the end of the USSR, Turkey has been monitoring with great attention
Russian influence over its former possessions, especially in the south, and from whom they depend
for an access to warm seas to operate their naval fleet. Turkish diplomacy preferred cooperation to
confrontation and encouraged better trade, business, and tourism, which fueled Turkey’s economic
growth in the last decade.
Conclusion
The Ukrainian and Crimean crisis are a major challenge for Turkish diplomacy but there is no
serious indication that Turkey will stand against Russia. Timing is also involved. The priority for the
Turkish government now is to ensure it will survive the corruption scandals and upcoming elections,
in which the situation in Crimea is not relevant to Turkish voters. Moreover, the once very assertive
and strong Turkish foreign policy vanished after Turkey got trapped in the Syrian crisis. Caution
dictates Turkey to align itself with its Western allies. For that matter, the Ukrainian crisis is one more
proof of the declining role of Turkish diplomacy in the region and deprives Erdogan's AKP
government from any aspiration to regional leadership.
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